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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to explore the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits 
in Ecuador using two different approaches: direct use of reported taxes and benefits in survey 
data, and use of simulated taxes and benefits. We make use of representative household 
microdata from ENIGHUR 2011-2012, which contains detailed information on labour and non-
labour income, taxes and social insurance contributions, public pensions, social benefits and 
expenditure, as well as personal and household characteristics. First, ECUAMOD, the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model for Ecuador is used to simulate cash benefit entitlements, personal 
income tax and social insurance contribution liabilities, as well as indirect taxes. Then, the 
redistributive effect of simulated tax-benefit policies is compared to that obtained from taxes, 
social insurance contributions and benefits taken directly from the data. Our results show that 
simulated taxes and social insurance contributions capture better the number of taxpayers and 
aggregate revenue amounts from official statistics, compared to information taken directly from 
the data. Moreover, using reported data on taxes and social insurance contributions 
underestimates their redistributive effect, compared to simulated policies. Underreporting of 
income components in survey data and the difficulty of simulating complex eligibility rules for 
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benefits in microsimulation models are some of the factors driving the differences between the 
two approaches. Our paper concludes with a discussion of the advantages offered by 
microsimulation for policy analysis. 
 
KEYWORDS: TAXES, BENEFITS, MICROSIMULATION, ECUADOR 
 
JEL classification: I32, I38, H24, D13 
  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MICROSIMULATION (2019) 12(1) 52-82  54 
JARA, VARELA    Tax-benefit Microsimulation and Income Redistribution in Ecuador  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the century, and along with the process of dollarization, the tax-benefit 
system in Ecuador has experienced numerous changes. As part of the reforms introduced in 
2008, personal income tax was made more progressive and tax collection became more efficient. 
The main social assistance benefit in Ecuador, the Human Development Transfer (HDT), has 
also been made more generous with the monthly payment increasing from USD 30 to USD 35 in 
2009, and then to USD 50 since 2013. Over the last decade, a significant decrease in income 
inequality was also observed, with the Gini coefficient falling from 55.1 in 2007 to 46.6 in 2016 
(INEC, 2016).1 From a policy perspective, it is important to assess the redistributive role of tax-
benefit instruments with the aim of improving their design in order to strengthen social 
protection in the country. 
The present study compares the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits in Ecuador under two 
different approaches. The first approach involves using reported information on taxes and 
benefits from survey data. The second relies on microsimulation techniques to calculate tax-
benefit instruments. As stressed by Figari, Iacovou, Skew, and Sutherland (2012), who carry out a 
similar analysis for selected EU countries, both approaches are subject to different degrees of 
error. On the one hand, research using data from developed economies has shown that welfare 
benefits may be underreported in household surveys (Lynn, Jäckle, Jenkins, & Sala, 2012; Meyer, 
Mok, & Sullivan, 2009). On the other hand, microsimulation models might overestimate means-
tested benefits if full take-up is assumed (Figari et al., 2012; Figari, Paulus, & Sutherland, 2015).  
Microsimulation models in Ecuador have been developed but limited to the analysis of specific 
tax components, such as personal income tax, corporate profit tax, and indirect taxes (Ramírez & 
Oliva, 2008; Ramírez, Cano, & Oliva, 2010; Ramírez, 2010; Ramírez & Carrillo 2012). However, 
an integrated microsimulation model encompassing both tax and benefit policies is needed if the 
objective is to perform distributional analysis. This paper makes use of ECUAMOD, the newly 
developed tax-benefit microsimulation model for Ecuador. ECUAMOD combines detailed 
country policy rules with representative household microdata from the National Survey of 
Income and Expenditures of Urban and Rural Households (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos de Hogares Urbanos y Rurales, ENIGHUR) 2011-2012 to simulate cash benefit 
entitlements, personal income tax and social insurance contribution liabilities, as well as VAT and 
excise duties for a number of products, for policy years 2011-2017. Our study takes advantage of 
the availability of reported data on social benefits, taxes and social insurance contributions in 
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ENIGHUR to compare their effect on income inequality and poverty to that of simulated tax-
benefit components calculated from ECUAMOD. 
The two approaches compared in this paper rely on the quality of the underlying microdata they 
use. Household survey data is generally affected by income underreporting, misreporting and 
might fail to capture the top of the market income distribution, particularly so in developing 
countries (Bustos & Leyva, 2017; CEPAL-IEF, 2014; Figari et al., 2015; Gómez Sabaíni & 
Rossignolo, 2015). Previous studies have further shown that underreporting might be particularly 
important in the case of self-employment income (Pissarides & Weber, 1989; Besim & Jenkins, 
2005; Hurst, Li, & Pugsley, 2014). Empirical evidence on income underreporting and 
underrepresentation of top incomes in survey data from Ecuador is scarce. Cano (2014) 
compares information from household surveys and tax records to show that in 2011 the share of 
income accruing to the top one per cent accounted for ten per cent according to survey data, 
whereas it accounted for 12.4 per cent based on tax records. The study shows that 
underreporting seems to be more prevalent among self-employed individuals and this type of 
income, together with capital income, represent a higher share of total income at the top of the 
income distribution in Ecuador. Problems of income underreporting or underrepresentation of 
top market incomes in survey data would necessarily affect results of tax-benefit microsimulation 
models based on household surveys. For instance, simulated income taxes or social insurance 
contributions might underestimate aggregate tax revenue from official sources if the survey fails 
to capture rich households. Note, however, that information on tax payments and benefit 
receipts collected in survey data might also suffer from underreporting or misreporting. As such, 
simulated taxes and benefits might provide a better match against administrative statistics than 
information reported directly in the survey data, depending of the degree of measurement error 
of each income component (Figari et al., 2015). 
In the case of Ecuador, as in most developing countries, rich household survey data containing 
detailed information about taxes and cash transfers is scarce. For this reason, research on the 
redistributive effect of taxes and benefits in Ecuador remains limited. CEPAL-IEF (2014) use 
household survey data to study the effect of tax-benefit systems on income inequality in Latin 
America. Results for Ecuador are based on the 2011 National Survey of Urban and Rural 
Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo, ENEMDUR). Information about cash transfers is taken directly from 
the data, whereas direct taxes are imputed. According to their results, direct taxes and cash 
transfers in Ecuador reduce income inequality by 2.8 points, when Gini for disposable income is 
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compared to Gini for market income. Public pensions and cash transfers account for 2 points 
reduction in inequality, whereas taxes and social insurance contributions account for 0.8 points. 
More recently, the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute has studied the incidence of taxes and 
benefits in Latin American countries under a common methodology.2 Lustig (2017) presents a 
comparative assessment of the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in Latin America. 
The results for Ecuador are based on reported information about cash transfers, taxes and social 
security contributions payments from ENIGHUR 2011-2012 (Llerena, Paul, Llerena Pinto, Saá 
Daza, & Llerena Pinto, 2015). According to Lustig (2017), the tax-benefit system in Ecuador 
reduces income inequality by 3.02 points, when Gini for disposable income is compared to Gini 
for market income.  
Distributional analysis based on ECUAMOD differs from previous studies in several respects. 
First, ECUAMOD systematically applies legislation rules to simulate taxes and benefits, based on 
the information available in the data. Lustig (2017) uses taxes and benefits reported directly in the 
data unless the information is not available, in which case these incomes are inferred, predicted or 
imputed from other sources. CEPAL-IEF (2014) use benefits information from the data but 
impute direct taxes. Second, contrary to Lustig (2017), our definition of market income does not 
include imputed rent, as this component is not considered in the calculations of poverty and 
inequality by the national statistics office in Ecuador. Finally, for Ecuador Lustig (2017) includes 
in-kind transfers such as free school breakfast, textbooks and uniforms as part of direct transfers 
(see Llerena et al., 2015). This information is imputed from other sources and not included in our 
simulations. Differences between our results and those of previous studies are on account of the 
abovementioned factors. 
Our results show that reported social assistance benefits (i.e. the Human Development Transfer) 
from ENIGHUR data match well the number of recipients and aggregate amounts from official 
sources, whereas simulated benefits are slightly underestimated due to the difficulty of simulating 
complex eligibility rules. Reported personal income tax provides a poor representation of the 
number of taxpayers and aggregate tax revenue relative to tax records, capturing only 22 per cent 
of tax revenue. ECUAMOD simulations match better the external statistics on personal income 
tax capturing around 82 per cent of income tax revenue, and highlighting the advantages of 
microsimulation to calculate income components which are difficult to collect in survey data. 
Our comparison of inequality and poverty indicators calculated from reported ENIGHUR data 
and simulated ECUAMOD data shows only minor differences between both approaches, with 
slightly lower estimates obtained with ECUAMOD simulations. Our results depict, however, a 
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very different picture of the redistributive effect of direct taxes and social insurance contributions 
depending on the approach used in the analysis. Direct taxes (social insurance contributions) 
reduce inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, only by 0.3 (0.9) points based on 
ENIGHUR data, whereas the effect is 1 (1.3) point(s) based on ECUAMOD simulations, which 
reflects the fact that ECUAMOD simulations capture better the number of taxpayers and tax 
revenue compared to ENIGHUR data. We discuss potential reasons for the observed 
discrepancies and highlight the advantages offered by ECUAMOD for distributional analysis and 
ex-ante policy evaluation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the household survey 
data used in the analysis and provides detailed information about our tax-benefit microsimulation 
model. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 National Survey of Income and Expenditures of Urban and Rural Households 
(ENIGHUR 2011-2012) 
ENIGHUR is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey on income and expenditures of 
households in Ecuador. The aim of the survey is to provide information on the distribution and 
structure of income and expenditures of Ecuadorean households based on the demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of the household members (INEC, 2012). The survey is 
conducted approximately every eight years. The latest ENIGHUR is for years 2011-12 and 
contains information for 39,617 households and 153,444 individuals. The survey follows a 
probabilistic two-stage sample design in nine self-represented cities, and a three-stage design in 
the rest of the country.3 The sampling unit is the dwelling defined as the person or group of 
people living in the same housing structure (dwelling), sharing meals, and who depend on a 
common budget. Information about the household and each member of the household 
occupying the dwelling is collected in the survey.  
ENIGHUR contains very detailed income information. Gross employment and self-employment 
income from principal and secondary occupations are reported, including extra pay, bonuses, in-
kind income and self-consumption from self-employment activities. Contributions to social 
security and tax payments are also collected for both, employees and self-employed workers.4 
Moreover, detailed information about affiliation to social security is reported, allowing to 
categorize individuals to specific social security regimes. Cash transfers from social benefits, such 
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as public pensions, the HDT, Joaquín Gallegos Lara transfer and the housing grant are also 
available. Other sources of income such as income from capital and property, private transfers, 
remittances, and other rents, are also reported in the data. Finally, detailed data on household 
expenditures is also available in the survey, as well as information on demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of each member of the household. 
The present study takes advantage of the availability of reported data on social benefits, taxes and 
social insurance contributions to compare their effect on income inequality and poverty relative 
to that of simulated tax-benefit components calculated from ECUAMOD, which is presented in 
the next section. 
2.2 ECUAMOD 
Our study makes use of ECUAMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model for Ecuador. 
ECUAMOD has been developed as part of UNU-WIDER’s project on ‘SOUTHMOD-
simulating tax and benefit policies for development’ in which tax-benefit microsimulation models 
have being built for selected developing countries. ECUAMOD and other country models from 
the SOUTHMOD project have been implemented on the EUROMOD software, which provides 
a harmonized setting for cross-country comparative analysis on the redistributive effect of tax-
benefit policies (see Sutherland & Figari 2013). ECUAMOD combines detailed country-specific 
coded policy rules with representative household microdata to simulate direct and indirect taxes, 
social insurance contributions, as well as cash transfers for the household population of Ecuador. 
ECUAMOD is a static model in the sense that tax-benefit simulations abstract from behavioural 
reactions of individuals and no adjustments are made for changes in the population composition 
over time. Simulation results for ECUAMOD have been validated against external statistics (see 
Jara, Varela, Cuesta, & Amores, 2017). 
The underlying microdata used in ECUAMOD comes from ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
Adjustments to the data and variables, for the construction of ECUAMOD’s input data, are kept 
to a minimum. On the one hand, individuals recorded as domestic employees in a household 
have been dropped, as information about their own household (e.g. number of children, 
expenditures) is not available. In total, 103 individuals (0.07 per cent of the sample) were dropped 
from the original sample, leaving us with a sample of 153,341 individuals. No households were 
dropped and no adjustments to the weights were made as a result of dropping individual 
observations. On the other hand, ENIGHUR data includes a single variable covering all pension 
payments. This variable includes contributory pensions, as well as severance pay and alimony for 
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divorce and children. This single variable is disaggregated into five variables in the ECUAMOD 
database according to the characteristics of the recipients: (i) old-age pension, (ii) disability 
pension, (iii) survivors’ pension, (iv) severance pay, and (v) alimony payments. In our analysis, the 
first three variables are considered as part of public pensions, severance pay is included in social 
benefits and alimony payments are included as part of market income.  
ECUAMOD version 1.4 covers policy years 2011-2017 for the purpose of tax-benefit 
simulations, based on ENIGHUR 2011-2012. To account for time inconsistencies between the 
input data year and the policy year in the simulations, market incomes and non-simulated tax-
benefit variables in the data are adjusted using source-specific updating factors (see Jara et al. 
2017). In this study, 2011 policies (as on June 30th) in Ecuador are used for the analysis.  
ECUAMOD aims to simulate the main tax and benefit components of household disposable 
income in Ecuador, where household disposable income is defined as the sum of market income 
plus government cash transfers of all household members net of income tax and social insurance 
contributions.5 However, simulation of tax-benefit instruments depends on the relevant 
information being available in the underlying dataset used in the simulations, in this case 
ENIGHUR 2011-2012. Instruments which are not simulated are taken directly from the data and 
included as part of disposable income. The remainder of this section describes briefly the policy 
instruments simulated in ECUAMOD for year 2011, as well as the underlying assumptions used 
in the simulations of each income component. Table A.1 in the appendix summarizes the tax and 
benefit components included in the model, differentiating between simulated and non-simulated 
components, and provides information about why simulation was not feasible. 
2.2.1 Employee social insurance contributions 
Social insurance contributions (SICs) in Ecuador are defined according to the sector where the 
person affiliated with the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security (Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Seguridad Social, IESS) works. ENIGHUR contains information about affiliation to social 
security for each individual in the data. ECUAMOD therefore simulates SIC payments only for 
those individuals, who report affiliation to the social security system in the survey. 
Employees SICs are simulated for three sectors of work: (a) private sector employees and secular 
clergy members; (b) bank employees, employees of municipal and decentralized public 
institutions, notaries, and property and commercial registrars; and (c) civil servants, including 
public education teachers and employees in the judiciary system, or other. All employees are 
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liable to pay SICs based on their gross employment income. The minimum contribution base 
equals the minimum wage (USD 264 in 2011) for full-time employees, or a fraction of the 
minimum wage based on the number of days of work for part-time employees. In 2011, 
employees were liable to four types of social contributions: pension insurance, rural worker 
insurance, severance pay insurance, and administrative costs. The total contribution rate was 9.35 
per cent or 11.35 per cent depending on the sector of work. Since 2009, pensioners also 
contribute to social insurance at a rate of 2.76 per cent of their pension income. Social insurance 
contributions from pensioners are categorised under employee SICs in ECUAMOD. 
2.2.2 Self-employed social insurance contributions 
Self-employed workers can contribute to SICs on a voluntary basis based on their declared gross 
self-employment income with specific rates. The minimum contribution base equals the 
minimum wage. Two categories of workers are considered for the simulation of self-employment 
SICs: self-employed workers and voluntary affiliated workers. In 2011, self-employed SICs 
included five types of contributions: pension insurance, health insurance, occupational risk 
insurance, rural worker insurance, and administrative costs. The total contribution rate for these 
categories was 17.50 per cent. An additional category of workers included in the simulation of 
self-employed SICs is rural workers, who are affiliated to the special rural worker social security 
regime (Seguro Campesino). In order to be member of the rural worker social security regime a 
person must: (i) have a residency in the rural area or be an artisanal fisherman, (ii) not be 
affiliated to the general social security regime, (iii) not receive remuneration from an employer, 
and (iv) not be a permanent employer. The amount of SICs paid by members of the rural worker 
social security regime is equal to 2.5 per cent of 22.5 per cent of the minimum wage. 
2.2.3 Employer social insurance contributions 
All employers are liable to pay SICs on gross employment income. Employers are liable to six 
types of SICs: pension insurance, health insurance, occupational risk insurance, rural worker 
insurance, severance pay insurance, and administrative costs. The total contribution rate for 
employers has been fixed at 9.15 per cent or 11.15 per cent depending on the sector of 
employment of their workers. Employer SICs do not enter in the definition of disposable income 
in ECUAMOD. 
2.2.4 Armed forces and police social insurance contributions 
Members of the armed forces or the national police contribute to special regimes of social 
insurance. Members of the armed forces are affiliated to the Institute of Social Security of the 
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Armed Forces (ISSFA), whereas members of the national police are affiliated to the Institute of 
Social Security of the National Police (ISSPOL). The information available in the input data for 
ECUAMOD allows us to distinguish those individuals who are affiliated to these specific 
regimes. For this reason, in addition to SICs to the IESS, ECUAMOD simulates contributions 
made by members of the armed forces or the national police. The rate of SICs for members of 
the ISSFA is 23 per cent, whereas the rate for members of the ISSPOL is 23.10 per cent. 
ECUAMOD simulates jointly SICs to ISSFA and ISSPOL, assuming a common rate of 23.05 per 
cent of earnings. This assumption is made due to the fact that the level of detail in the input data 
for ECUAMOD does not allow distinguishing whether an individual is affiliated to the ISSFA or 
the ISSPOL. Additionally, ECUAMOD simulates the government contribution to these special 
regimes at the 26 per cent rate, however, this contribution is not included as part of disposable 
income in ECUAMOD. 
2.2.5 Personal income tax 
Personal income tax in Ecuador is assessed at the individual level. The tax base is defined as 
taxable income minus exemptions, minus deductions. Since 2008, taxable income is composed of 
gross earnings from labour (employment and self-employment income), plus extra pay, plus 
utilities participation.6 The main sources of income exempted are income from pensions from the 
IESS, the 13th and 14th months’ pay, reserve funds, and deductions for old age and disabled 
persons. Deductions from taxable income are composed of contributions to social security and 
deductions from personal expenditures, which include expenditure in food, clothing, education, 
health, and housing.7 The tax schedule applied to the tax base is formed from nine tax bands and 
rates between 0 and 35 per cent.  
In ECUAMOD, personal income tax is simulated under the assumption of full compliance (zero 
evasion). Simulation of some sort of tax evasion could be included in future versions of the 
model, based on certain assumptions about people who might be evading tax payments. 
2.2.6 Indirect taxes 
Since 2000, the VAT rate has been set at 12 per cent.8 Some goods and services considered 
necessities are taxed at a zero per cent rate, such as food products and basic services like water 
and electricity. A special consumption tax (Impuesto a los consumos especiales, ICE), which 
represents a form of excise duty, is also applied to specific products and services, such as alcohol, 
tobacco products, and automobiles. The rates vary widely with respect to the type of good. In 
ECUAMOD, indirect taxes are simulated based on information from household expenditures on 
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different types of goods and services, available from the data. The 12 per cent rate is applied to 
expenditure in goods subject to VAT. ECUAMOD also simulates ICE for four types of goods 
based on the number of observations in the data for which consumption of these goods is 
observed. In particular, we simulate ICE for alcoholic drinks including beer, cigarettes, soda 
drinks, and perfumes.9  
2.2.7 Human Development Transfer (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) 
The Human Development Transfer (HDT) is a proxy means-tested conditional cash transfer 
(CCT). Proxy means-tested transfers are common in developing countries and involve evaluating 
eligibility not in terms of income (means-test) but in terms of a composite index of socio-
economic characteristics (proxy means-test). A household is considered eligible for the transfer if 
their composite index is below a certain threshold. In Ecuador, the proxy means-test is based on 
the composite index of socio-economic classification of the Social Registry, which is based on a 
series of variables containing information on household characteristics, characteristics of the head 
of the household, housing, living conditions, assets, and territory. Three population subgroups 
are eligible for HDT: (i) families with children younger than 18 years, (ii) elderly adults who do 
not receive any pension, and (iii) disabled persons. In order to be eligible for HDT, families of 
children aged 18 years or below need to belong to the poorest population according to the 
composite index. Elderly adults and disabled persons (with 40 per cent or higher degree of 
disability) need to be in vulnerability conditions (as defined by the Ministry of Social 
Development Coordination) and cannot be affiliated with any type of social security institutions.  
In 2011, the benefit amount for HDT was USD 35 per month. Since 2013, the amount has been 
fixed at USD 50 per month (Presidencia de la República, 2009, 2013). Two types of conditionality 
apply to mothers with children receiving HDT. First, it is required that children aged 6 to 18 
years in the household enrol in school and attend at least 90 per cent of the school days in a 
month. Second, it is required that children below six years in the household attend health centres 
at least twice per year for medical check-ups.10  
In order to simulate eligibility for HDT in ECUAMOD, a pseudo composite index was generated 
in the input data. Our pseudo index and the official index are likely to have different distributions 
as they are based on different samples. 11 Therefore, we determine the threshold for eligibility as 
the value of the pseudo index below which we identify the same number of individuals as the 
official index. 
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2.2.8 Transfer Joaquín Gallegos Lara 
The transfer Joaquín Gallegos Lara was introduced with the aim of improving living conditions 
of people with severe disabilities or illness, who are unable to live independently and who live 
under critical economic conditions (Presidencia de la República 2010: Executive Decree 422). 
The following categories are eligible for the benefit: (i) individuals with at least 75 per cent level 
of physical disability or 65 per cent of mental disability; (ii) individuals with catastrophic or rare 
illnesses, who are not affiliated with or receiving pensions from the social security system; (iii) 
children below the age of 14 years living with HIV/AIDS; and (iv) orphans. The amount of the 
benefit is USD 240 per month and it is paid to the person responsible for the care of the 
individual with a disability or illness. The benefit is not subject to income test.  
In ECUAMOD, the transfer Joaquín Gallegos Lara is only partially simulated, meaning that 
eligibility to the benefit is based on whether individuals are observed receiving the benefit in the 
data. Full simulation (simulation of eligibility) is not possible because information about the 
degree of disability is not available in the data. 
2.2.9 Non-simulated taxes and benefits 
Contributory pensions are included in the concept of disposable income used by ECUAMOD 
but cannot be simulated due to lack of information on contributory records. The same applies to 
injury benefit and severance pay. Scholarships cannot be simulated because information on 
students’ grades is not available in the data. No information on price of properties to be 
purchased or remodelling costs are available to simulate housing grant. Property and property 
transfer tax, motor vehicle and wealth tax are taken directly from the data and subtracted in the 
calculation of disposable income but cannot be simulated due to lack of data on property values, 
vehicle values and wealth, respectively. 
3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the main findings of our comparison of income distributions based on 
reported survey income data and tax-benefit microsimulation. First, we provide a detailed 
comparison of the number of benefit recipients and taxpayers, as well as aggregate yearly 
amounts of taxes and benefits obtained under both approaches against external official statistics. 
Then, we analyse the relative importance of different tax-benefit components across the income 
distribution in Ecuador. Third, we compare poverty and inequality indicators obtained with 
ENIGHUR and ECUAMOD data. Finally, we provide a picture of the effect of different tax-
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benefit components on income poverty and inequality with both approaches and discuss factors 
driving discrepancies. 
3.1 Validation of reported and simulated tax-benefit instruments 
Validation of simulated taxes and benefit is a crucial part of microsimulation modelling. In this 
section, we propose comparing information about the number of benefit recipients and taxpayers 
as well as aggregate annual expenditure in social benefits and revenue from taxes and SICs 
obtained with ECUAMOD and reported in ENIGHUR against external official data.  
The numbers of recipients of benefits and payers of taxes and SICs obtained with ECUAMOD 
and reported in ENIGHUR are compared with external benchmarks in Table 1. In terms of 
benefits, the results show that ENIGHUR data captures around 91 per cent of beneficiaries of 
the Human Development Transfer compared to external statistics. The underrepresentation in 
the data is likely to be related to the fact that external statistics report the total number of 
beneficiaries over the whole year, whereas the survey asks respondents whether they have 
received the transfer over the past three months. ECUAMOD underestimates the number of 
recipients of the Human Development Transfer by around 17 per cent compared to external 
statistics. As mentioned in the previous section, in order to assess eligibility for the HDT in our 
simulations, we replicated the index of the Social Register with the input data and fixed the 
threshold of eligibility by identifying the same number of people below the official threshold. 
Note that this is different from calibrating the number of recipients of the transfer because other 
eligibility conditions, simulated in ECUAMOD, apply in addition to being below the threshold of 
the composite index, such as the presence of children in the household or non-affiliation to social 
security in the case of elderly adults and disabled persons. The underestimation of recipients of 
the HDT in ECUAMOD could therefore be related to non-fulfilment of eligibility conditions of 
individuals below the threshold due to differences in characteristics with actual recipients but also 
to a certain degree of digression from the authorities as to who is considered eligible for the 
transfer, which cannot be captured in our simulations.  
The number of recipients of the disability carer benefit Joaquín Gallegos Lara obtained from 
ECUAMOD matches those of ENIGHUR because, as previously mentioned, simulations of the 
disability carer benefit are based on actual benefit receipt in the data. Disability carer benefit 
cannot be fully simulated because eligibility depends on the severity of disability and this 
information is unavailable in the data. ENIGHUR and ECUAMOD results underestimate the 
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number of recipients of the disability carer benefit reflecting that this population subgroup is not 
properly captured by the survey.  
In terms of taxes and SICs, ECUAMOD underestimates the number of payers compared with 
data from the Ecuadorean Social Security Institute (IESS) and the Internal Revenues Service 
(SRI), which might be related to income underreporting in the underlying input data. Note, 
however, that the underestimation of personal income tax and SICs payers is even more severe 
when reported payers from ENIGHUR are compared with external statistics. In particular, 
ENIGHUR data captures only 43 per cent of personal income taxpayers compared to 70 per 
cent obtained with ECUAMOD, reflecting the difficulties of collecting tax data in household 
surveys and highlighting the usefulness of microsimulation to calculate this type of income. The 
underestimation of self-employed SICs payers in ENIGHUR is related to the fact that the data 
does not contain information on payments to rural workers’ SICs (Seguro Campesino), which are 
simulated in ECUAMOD and are included in the official figures. The gap between the number of 
income taxpayers obtained from ECUAMOD and that of official statistics is most likely driven 
by income underreporting and underrepresentation of individuals at the top of the market 
income distribution in ENIGHUR data. Note that in Ecuador (like in many other Latin 
American countries) deductions from personal expenditures apply to income tax and the 
exemption threshold for income tax payment is rather high. In 2011, annual incomes below the 
USD 9,210 threshold were exempt from income tax, whereas the annualised minimum wage was 
equal to USD 3,168. Most individuals non-affiliated with social security have low earnings and, 
therefore, even under the assumption of full-compliance in our simulations they would pay no 
income tax. 
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Table 1: Tax–benefit instruments in 2011: number of recipients/payers (in thousands). 
  ECUAMOD ENIGHUR External Ratios 
(A) (B) (C) (A)/(B) (A)/(C) (B)/(C) 
Social Benefits       
Human Development 
Transfer 
1,538 1,681 1,854 0.92 0.83 0.91 
Joaquín Gallegos 
Lara 
9 9 14 1.00 0.64 0.64 
Taxes and Social Insurance Contributions (SICs) 
    
Personal income tax 334 204 476 1.64 0.70 0.43 
Employee SICs 2,134 1,836 2,449 1.16 0.87 0.75 
Self-employed SICs 255 74 341 3.46 0.75 0.22 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations, ENIGHUR 2011-2012 and IESS (2015). 
Table 2 presents a validation of reported and simulated aggregate annual expenditure in social 
benefits and revenue from taxes and SICs. Aggregate expenditure in the HDT from ENIGHUR 
data matches well the external benchmark, which reflects the fact that survey data in Ecuador 
captures well the bottom of the income distribution. ECUAMOD simulations underestimate 
aggregate expenditure in the HDT by around six per cent in comparison to ENIGHUR data and 
nine per cent with respect to external statistics, which is in line with the underestimation of 
benefit recipients. Reported and simulated amounts of Joaquín Gallegos Lara transfer 
underestimate the aggregate amounts compared with external sources by around 40 per cent, 
reflecting the underestimation of benefit recipients in the data (see Table 1).  
In terms of taxes and SICs, our simulations underestimate the aggregate amount of personal 
income tax and SICs compared with external statistics. ECUAMOD simulations capture around 
82 per cent of revenue from personal income tax and 98 per cent of employee SICs. On the 
other hand, results obtained directly from ENIGHUR data provide an extremely poor match 
against the external benchmark. Reported personal income tax amounts from ENIGHUR 
capture only 22 per cent of personal income tax revenue. Reported employee SICs’ amounts 
provide a better fit, capturing 88 per cent of employee SICs revenue, compared to 98 per cent 
captured by ECUAMOD results. The poor representation of aggregate annual revenue from 
personal income tax provided by ENIGHUR data is most likely related to the abovementioned 
difficulties of reporting this type of deductions in surveys and points to the importance of using 
simulated taxes to assess the effect of this component on the income distribution, as its effect 
would be otherwise underestimated. The underestimation of income tax might also be related to 
the fact that, in general, surveys fail to properly capture the top of the income distribution and 
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this is particularly the case for developing countries like Ecuador. The comparison of simulated 
and reported revenue from self-employed SICs with respect to official statistics is rather puzzling. 
Both simulated and reported results overestimate the revenue from self-employed SICs 
compared to the external benchmark. The results are counterintuitive given that the number of 
payers of self-employed SICs obtained from ECUAMOD and ENIGHUR underestimates the 
number of payers with respect to official statistics. The discrepancies might be related to the 
categories of workers for which SICs revenue has been reported by the authorities. ECUAMOD 
and ENIGHUR results consider as self-employed any person reporting income from self-
employment, whereas external statistics might be based on people officially registered as self-
employed at IESS. Finally, Table 2 provides a comparison of aggregate revenue from VAT. 
Compared with external statistics, ECUAMOD underestimates VAT by around 44 per cent. 
VAT reported by ENIGHUR represents only 19 per cent of the official aggregate amounts. 
However, it is worth noting that ENIGHUR reports VAT payments by the self-employed only, 
as part of their expenditures. VAT payment by households is not directly reported by 
ENIGHUR. On the other hand, ECUAMOD simulates VAT payments by households only, 
whereas the official statistics on VAT include payments by both households and firms. 
Table 2: Tax–benefit instruments in 2011: annual amounts (in millions). 
  ECUAMOD ENIGHUR External Ratios 
(A) (B) (C) (A)/(B) (A)/(C) (B)/(C) 
Social Benefits       
Human Development 
Transfer 
661 706 724 0.94 0.91 0.97 
Joaquín Gallegos 
Lara 
26 24 41 1.07 0.62 0.58 
Taxes and Social Insurance Contributions (SICs) 
    
Personal income tax 639 171 784 3.75 0.82 0.22 
Employee SICs 1,478 1,322 1,508 1.12 0.98 0.88 
Self-employed SICs 332 268 176 1.24 1.88 1.52 
VAT 1,708 592 3,073 2.88 0.56 0.19 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations, ENIGHUR 2011-2012 and IESS (2018). 
3.2 Relative size of tax-benefit instruments 
Before comparing poverty, inequality and the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems between 
our two approaches, it is worth considering the extent to which the size of different tax-benefit 
components varies across the income distribution depending on the use of simulated or reported 
incomes. Figure 1 shows the relative size of five tax-benefit components in Ecuador, where the 
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average size of each income component is measured as a percentage of average household 
disposable income by household disposable income decile, and on average for the whole 
population. Direct and indirect taxes, and social insurance contributions are shown as negative 
values as they are subtracted in the calculation of disposable income. 
Figure 1: Tax-benefit components as a share of household disposable income in 2011. 
 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
Under both approaches, our results show that social benefits play an important role at the 
bottom of the income distribution. Social benefits represent on average 20 per cent of household 
disposable income for individuals in the bottom decile of the income distribution with 
ECUAMOD and 22 per cent with reported benefits from ENIGHUR. The slightly larger size of 
social benefits with ENIGHUR data reflects the fact that ECUAMOD simulations of the 
Human Development Transfer slightly underestimate the number of recipients and aggregate 
amounts of this benefit compared to ENIGHUR, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 above.12  
ECUAMOD and ENIGHUR results differ more in terms of the relative size of taxes and SICs. 
Simulated direct taxes represent an important proportion (5.4 per cent) of household disposable 
income only for the top decile of the income distribution. This might be due to the high 
exemption threshold for income tax payment and also to the presence of deductions from 
personal expenditures, which are applied to taxable income. Direct taxes reported in the data 
account only for 1.7 per cent of household disposable income for the top decile. The 
discrepancies between ECUAMOD and ENIGUR results might be driven by underreporting or 
misreporting of personal income tax in ENIGHUR and reflect the difficulties of recording this 
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type of income in surveys. Indirect taxes in ECUAMOD are mostly proportional with respect to 
disposable income, although the relative size of this income component is slightly larger for the 
first income decile pointing to a minor regressivity. The mostly proportional nature of indirect 
taxes is in line with a recent paper by Rojas Baez (2017) and is driven by the presence of a zero 
per cent VAT rate on goods and services considered basic necessities. The relative size of indirect 
taxes in ENIGHUR is on average smaller than that of ECUAMOD and they appear to affect 
mostly the top income decile. Differences between ENIGHUR and ECUAMOD results in terms 
of indirect taxes are due to the fact that ENIGHUR reports VAT payments from expenditures 
related to self-employment activities only, whereas VAT payments for all households are 
calculated in ECUAMOD simulations based on expenditure information available in the survey. 
Finally, reported and simulated social insurance contributions are progressive in nature but 
represent a smaller share of household disposable income with results based on ENIGHUR data.  
Table 3 confirms the pattern of tax-benefit components with respect to disposable income in our 
two approaches, where the progressivity of different policy instruments is assessed using the Suits 
index. The Suits index measures the ratio between the cumulative proportion of a policy 
instrument (e.g. income tax) and the cumulative proportion of income. The value of the Suits 
index lies within the interval [-1, 1]. A value of -1 would imply an extremely regressive policy 
instrument (e.g. the poorest person pays all the tax), whereas a value of 1 depicts extreme 
progressivity (e.g. the richest person pays all the tax). Our results show that direct taxes and SICs 
are progressive with respect to disposable income but to a larger extent with results obtained 
from ECUAMOD. Public pensions are regressive, whereas social benefits are progressive. 
Finally, ECUAMOD and ENIGHUR provide contrasting results in terms of progressivity of 
indirect taxes. Reported VAT in ENIGHUR are progressive with respect to disposable income, 
whereas ECUAMOD results point to a minor regressivity of indirect taxes, which is in line with 
the fairly proportional nature of this income component (see Figure 1). 
Table 3: Progressivity of tax-benefit components in 2011– Suits index. 
 
Public 
Pensions 
Social 
Benefits 
Direct 
Taxes 
Social Insurance 
Contributions 
Indirect 
Taxes 
ECUAMOD -0.21 0.62 0.74 0.25 -0.03 
ENIGHUR -0.19 0.61 0.42 0.24 0.83 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
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3.3 Poverty and Inequality 
Table 4 presents the results of our comparison of inequality and poverty indicators calculated 
from the reported ENIGHUR data and the simulated ECUAMOD data. The results are 
computed for individuals according to their household disposable income (HDI) per capita (i.e. 
HDI divided by household size). HDI is calculated as the sum of all income sources of all 
household members net of income tax and SICs. Using HDI per capita is the approach proposed 
by the National Institute for Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INEC) 
to calculate income poverty and inequality.  
In terms of income inequality, Table 4 shows that the Gini coefficient obtained with the two sets 
of results are very similar. The Gini coefficient obtained from ENIGHUR data is slightly higher 
(by only three per cent) but the difference with the estimate from ECUAMOD data is small. The 
same applies to results for the p90/p10 ratio. Table 4 also presents the Atkinson index using 
three values for the parameter of ‘inequality aversion’, 𝜀 = 0.5, 1 and 2. Calculating the Atkinson 
index for different values of 𝜀 allows us to change the importance attached to variations at 
different points in the income distribution, with larger values of 𝜀 being more sensitive to 
variations at the lower end of the income distribution. ENIGHUR data provides slightly larger 
estimates for the Atkinson index. The gap between ENIGHUR and ECUAMOD data estimates 
is the largest for the Atkinson index with 𝜀 = 0.5, with a difference of eight per cent of the size 
of the ECUAMOD estimate. 
The second and third sections of Table 4 compare statistics on absolute poverty and extreme 
poverty headcounts calculated under the two approaches. The national poverty lines of USD 
72.87 per month for poverty and USD 41.06 per month for extreme poverty are used in the 
calculations.13 As it was the case for inequality, absolute poverty and extreme poverty calculated 
using reported ENIGHUR data are slightly higher than those based on simulated incomes. Our 
results further distinguish poverty estimates between households living in the urban or rural area 
of the country. The discrepancies between poverty estimates calculated from ENIGHUR data 
and ECUAMOD data are more marked in the urban area. The gap between urban extreme 
poverty from ENIGHUR data and ECUAMOD simulations is around 15 per cent, although this 
represents 0.4 percentage points given the low levels of extreme poverty in urban areas of the 
country. 
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Table 4: Absolute poverty rates and income inequality in 2011. 
  
ECUAMOD ENIGHUR Ratio 
(A) (B) (A)/(B) 
Inequality 
   
Gini 46.1 47.7 0.97 
p90/p10 7.4 7.7 0.96 
Atkinson index (0.5) 17.8 19.3 0.92 
Atkinson index (1) 30.8 32.6 0.94 
Atkinson index (2) 50.5 52.4 0.96 
Poverty headcount  
  
Total 20.8 21.7 0.96 
Urban 12.5 13.3 0.94 
Rural 37.6 38.5 0.98 
Extreme poverty headcount 
  
Total 5.7 6.2 0.94 
Urban 2.3 2.7 0.85 
Rural 12.7 13.3 0.95 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
Notes: Computed for individuals according to their household disposable income per capita. Household disposable income is calculated as the 
sum of all income sources of all household members net of income tax and SICs. 
The comparison of poverty and inequality calculated under our two approaches points to only 
minor differences. However, as observed in the previous section, the relative size and 
progressivity of particular tax-benefit components can vary considerably depending on the use of 
reported or simulated incomes. For instance, reported information on personal income tax 
payments seems to suffer from underreporting in the survey, which translates into a modest 
impact of reported income tax on household disposable income (see Figure 1). ECUAMOD 
simulations match better external statistics and translate into a larger effect of income tax at the 
top of the income distribution and therefore lower income inequality. From a policy perspective, 
it is important to have a clear idea of the effect of individual tax-benefit instruments on poverty 
and inequality. This is particularly relevant given the different degrees of measurement errors (e.g. 
underreporting or underrepresentation of top incomes) that individual income components 
might suffer from. The following section compares the extent to which the effect of tax-benefit 
components differs depending on whether reported or simulated incomes are used in the 
analysis. 
3.4 The effect of taxes and benefits on income inequality and poverty 
Assessing the role of taxes and benefits in reducing poverty and inequality is essential to improve 
the design of existing and new policy instruments. Table 5 compares results for the Gini 
coefficient, the poverty headcount and extreme poverty headcount of household disposable 
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income and household market income per capita under our two approaches. The results show 
that direct taxes and cash transfers reduce income inequality by 4.1 points (50.2 minus 46.1) 
based on ECUAMOD data. The redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system is reduced by 
almost half based on ENIGHUR data, accounting for 2.5 points reduction in inequality (50.2 
minus 47.7). Absolute poverty is reduced by 4.1 points when simulated disposable income is 
compared to market income, whereas a 3.2 points decrease is observed with reported incomes 
from ENIGHUR data. The effect of the tax-benefit system on extreme poverty is more similar 
between the two approaches: extreme poverty is reduced by 3.7 (3.2) points when ECUAMOD 
(ENIGHUR) data is used. 
Table 5: Effect of the tax-benefit system on income inequality and poverty in 2011. 
 
Market income  Disposable income (DPI) Difference 
Gini coefficient   
ECUAMOD 50.2 46.1 4.1 
ENIGHUR 50.2 47.7 2.5 
Poverty headcount   
ECUAMOD 24.9 20.8 4.1 
ENIGHUR 24.9 21.7 3.2 
Extreme poverty headcount   
ECUAMOD 9.4 5.7 3.7 
ENIGHUR 9.4 6.2 3.2 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
The effect of specific tax-benefit components on income inequality and poverty under our two 
approaches is presented in Tables 6 and 7. The marginal contribution of individual tax-benefit 
components is obtained from the difference between inequality/poverty for disposable income 
with and without the tax-benefit component in question. As such, in order to assess the effect of 
public pensions and social benefits, we subtract each component separately from disposable 
income and recalculate income inequality and poverty. In order to assess the effect of direct taxes 
and SICs, we add back each component separately to disposable income and recalculate poverty 
and inequality. Finally, we also present poverty and inequality estimates for disposable income 
minus indirect taxes.  
Under both approaches, the income component that reduces inequality the most is social 
benefits; accounting for a reduction of around 1.7 points, when Gini for disposable income is 
compared to Gini for disposable income minus social benefits (column A minus column C). The 
role of public pensions is minor in both cases. Table 6 points to a very different effect of direct 
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taxes and SICs depending on the approach used in the analysis. SICs reduce income inequality by 
1.3 points based on ECUAMOD data, whereas the effect of SICs is 0.9 points when reported 
incomes are used (column A minus column E). The differences are even more striking for direct 
taxes, which contribute to inequality reduction by 1 point with ECUAMOD data and only 0.3 
points with ENIGHUR data (column A minus column D). Finally, indirect taxes tend to slightly 
increase inequality according to ECUAMOD simulations, whereas inequality decreases by 0.8 
points when the Gini for disposable income is compared to the Gini for disposable income 
minus indirect taxes reported in ENIGHUR (column A minus column F). 
Table 6: Effect of tax-benefit components on income inequality in 2011. 
  
Disposable 
income 
(DPI) 
DPI minus 
Public 
Pensions 
DPI minus 
Social 
Benefits 
DPI plus 
Direct 
Taxes 
DPI 
plus 
SICs 
DPI minus 
Indirect 
Taxes 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
ECUAMOD 46.1 46.3 47.8 47.1 47.4 46.2 
ENIGHUR 47.7 47.9 49.4 48.0 48.6 46.9 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
Table 7 presents the effect of tax-benefit instruments on absolute poverty and extreme poverty 
under our two approaches. The income component that reduces poverty and extreme poverty 
the most is social benefits and the effect is very similar under the two approaches. Social benefits 
reduce poverty by 3.4 points and extreme poverty by 2.9 points with both ECUAMOD and 
ENIGHUR data (column A minus column C). The effect of public pensions is also similar under 
the two approaches, reducing poverty by around 1.4 points and extreme poverty by around 1 
point (column A minus column B). The role played by direct taxes and SICs is, on the other 
hand, very modest under the two approaches and adding them back to disposable income results 
in slightly lower poverty levels. Finally, our two approaches provide a very different picture of the 
effect of indirect taxes. Subtracting indirect taxes from disposable income increases poverty by 
2.1 points and extreme poverty by 0.9 points based on simulated data from ECUAMOD, 
whereas neither poverty nor extreme poverty are affected when reported VAT is deducted from 
disposable income calculated from ENIGHUR data (column A minus column F). 
The results presented in this section highlight the extent to which individual tax-benefit 
instruments might be subject to different degrees of measurement error depending on the 
approach used for the analysis, and the effect of such differences on income inequality and 
poverty. On the one hand, the effect of social benefits on income inequality and poverty is 
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similar under the two approaches. However, it is important to bear in mind that ECUAMOD 
results underestimate the number of HDT beneficiaries due to the complexity of simulating 
eligibility rules for this cash transfer. On the other hand, the larger effect of simulated direct taxes 
on income inequality reflects the fact that reported tax payments in the data suffer from 
underreporting or misreporting and therefore simulating personal income tax based on market 
income information available in the survey captures a larger number of taxpayers. As noted 
before, problems of underreporting and underrepresentation of the top of the market income 
distribution also result in an underestimation of tax revenue if ECUAMOD results are compared 
to external statistics. Finally, the use of comparable income information under both approaches 
has an important effect on the results. Our two approaches provide a very different picture of the 
effect of indirect taxes. This is due to the fact that indirect taxes reported in ENIGHUR relate 
only to VAT payments from expenditures linked to self-employment activities, whereas 
ECUAMOD results represent VAT payments by all households calculated from expenditure 
information available in the survey. 
Table 7: Effect of tax-benefit components on income poverty in 2011. 
  
Disposable 
income 
(DPI) 
DPI 
minus 
Public 
Pensions 
DPI 
minus 
Social 
Benefits 
DPI 
plus 
Direct 
Taxes 
DPI 
plus 
SICs 
DPI 
minus 
Indirect 
Taxes 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Poverty headcount      
ECUAMOD 20.8 22.3 24.2 20.7 20.3 22.9 
ENIGHUR 21.7 23.1 25.1 21.6 21.4 21.7 
Extreme poverty headcount      
ECUAMOD 5.7 6.7 8.6 5.7 5.7 6.6 
ENIGHUR 6.2 7.1 9.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.4 calculations and ENIGHUR 2011-2012. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems in developing countries is 
paramount for the improvement of existing policies and the development of new instruments 
with the view of strengthening social protection. In this paper, we compared the redistributive 
effect of taxes and benefits in Ecuador under two different approaches. The first approach 
involved using reported information on taxes and benefits from ENIGHUR data, whereas the 
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second approach made use of the newly developed microsimulation model for Ecuador, 
ECUAMOD, to calculate tax-benefit instruments. 
Under the two approaches compared in this study, data quality plays an important role. Our 
results show that ENIGHUR data provides a poor representation of the number of taxpayers 
and aggregate tax revenue relative to tax records, which is most likely related to underreporting or 
misreporting. ECUAMOD simulations of personal income tax match better external statistics, 
but still capture only 82 per cent of tax revenue. Income underreporting and underrepresentation 
of rich individuals in household survey data are the likely drivers of this discrepancy as market 
income information is taken directly from ENIGHUR data for the simulation of income tax. In 
terms of benefits, ENIGHUR data captures very well the number of recipients and aggregate 
amounts of the Human Development Transfer, the main social assistance benefit in Ecuador. 
ECUAMOD simulations, on the other hand, underestimate the number of HDT beneficiaries 
and aggregate expenditure. This reflects the difficulties of simulating complex eligibility rules in 
microsimulation models, in our case, reproducing the composite index of eligibility for the 
Human Development Transfer. 
Our results further show the extent to which inequality and poverty indicators vary due to 
differences between reported and simulated taxes and benefits. Inequality and poverty indicators 
obtained from ECUAMOD simulations slightly underestimate those based on ENIGHUR data. 
The Gini coefficient for disposable income is 1.6 points lower with ECUAMOD data compared 
to ENIGHUR data (46.1 compared to 47.7), whereas the absolute poverty headcount is 0.9 
points lower (20.8 compared to 21.7). Under both approaches, social assistance benefits are the 
instrument that has the largest effect in inequality reduction and the size of its effect is similar 
with ENIGHUR and ECUAMOD data. However, important differences between the two 
approaches are observed in terms of the redistributive effect of direct taxes. Based on 
ENIGHUR data, direct taxes reduce inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, only by 0.3 
points, whereas the effect is of 1 point based on ECUAMOD simulations. The discrepancies 
between the two approaches reflect the fact that personal income tax is poorly captured in the 
household survey data. As such, our results point to a much larger effect of direct taxes in 
reducing inequality compared to previous studies, which have either used reported incomes or 
imputed taxes from other sources into survey data. 
The findings presented in this paper have focused on the extent to which income inequality and 
poverty estimates obtained from the newly developed tax-benefit model ECUAMOD are 
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consistent with those obtained directly from ENIGHUR data. An alternative direction for the 
study of the redistributive effect of actual tax-benefit systems could have made use only of those 
simulated components which match better external statistics; in our case, social insurance 
contributions and personal income tax. The redistributive effects of the tax-benefit system in 
Ecuador under such exercise are similar to those of ECUAMOD, as it is mainly the redistributive 
effect of income taxes that differs between the two approaches. It should be noted, however, that 
the study of the redistributive effect of actual or current tax-benefit policies is only one of many 
applications of microsimulation models. In principle, simulating as many instruments as possible 
is more desirable for exercises in which reforms to such policies would be simulated.  
The results presented here suggest a number of extensions and directions for future research 
based on ECUAMOD. First, the underestimation of the number of taxpayers and aggregate tax 
revenue from ECUAMOD simulations, due to problems underreporting and 
underrepresentation of the top of the market income distribution in household surveys, points to 
the need of enriching survey data. Imputations based on administrative tax records could be 
considered in future versions of the model to assess their impact on the simulations. Second, the 
possibility of relaxing the assumption of full compliance with tax rules should be considered 
through the simulation of some sort of tax-evasion based on information collected by the public 
administration or on different definitions of informality. Third, we should consider extending the 
scope of our simulations to provide a broader picture of the role of the welfare state, for 
instance, through simulating indirect fuel subsidies. Finally, the development of a regional tax-
benefit microsimulation model for Latin America, using a common harmonised language, 
represents an important opportunity for policy developments and collaborations within the 
region. Progress on this area is already being made with the development of a microsimulation 
model for Colombia, which allows performing comparative analysis (Bargain, Jara, & Rodriguez, 
2017). All these issues represent promising areas for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Simulation of taxes and benefits in ECUAMOD. 
Policy instrument 
Treatment in 
ECUAMOD 
Why not fully simulated? 
   Simulated tax-benefit instruments 
  
Employee social insurance 
contributions 
Simulated - 
Armed forces and police 
social insurance 
contributions 
Simulated - 
Self-employed social 
insurance contributions 
Simulated - 
Employer social insurance 
contributions 
Simulated - 
Government social 
insurance contributions for 
armed forces and police 
Simulated - 
Personal income tax Simulated - 
Human development 
transfer (HDT) 
Simulated - 
Joaquín Gallegos Lara Partially simulated 
Eligibility for the benefit cannot be 
simulated to lack of information 
about severity of disability in the data 
Value added tax (VAT) Simulated - 
Special consumption tax 
(excise duties) 
Simulated - 
   
Non-simulated tax-benefit instruments 
 
Old-age pension Included No data on contribution records 
Invalidity pension Included No data on contribution records 
Survivors’ pension Included No data on contribution records 
Injury benefit Included No data on contribution records 
Severance payments Included No data on contribution records 
Scholarships Included 
No information about students’ 
grades to determine eligibility for 
scholarships 
Housing grant Included 
No information about the price of 
the property individuals intend to buy 
nor about the cost of planned 
remodelling for their current house 
Property tax and property 
transfer tax 
Included 
No information on property values in 
the data 
Wealth tax Included No information on wealth in the data 
Motor vehicle tax Included 
No information on vehicle values in 
the data 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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NOTES 
1 Differences between INEC (2016) figures and the results presented in this study are due to the use of different 
surveys in the analysis. INEC (2016) figures are based on the National Survey of Employment, Underemployment 
and Unemployment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo, ENEMDUR). 
2 For more information about CEQ, see http://www.commitmentoequity.org/. 
3 The nine self-represented cities are: Cuenca, Machala, Esmeraldas, Guayaquil, Loja, Manta, Quito, Ambato, and 
Santo Domingo.  
4 Respondents are asked to report how much was deducted from their monthly gross income in terms of social 
insurance contributions. Additionally, the survey asks employees to report how much was deducted from their 
monthly gross income in terms of income tax, and the self-employed to report how much income tax they paid over 
the last twelve months.  
5 Market income is the sum of employment and self-employment income, bonuses, in-kind income, self-
consumption from self-employment activities, capital and property income, inter-household payments, private 
transfers, minus alimony payments. Imputed rent is not included as part of market income. 
6 Utilities participation is a benefit for employees, where 15 per cent of a firm’s utilities are distributed among all 
employees in the firm. 
7 Deductions from personal expenditures cannot be higher than 50 per cent of taxable income or 1.3 times the basic 
exempted band. Additionally, there are individual limits for each type of expenditure. Expenditure in food, housing, 
education, and clothing cannot exceed 0.325 times the basic exempted band, individually. Expenditure in health 
cannot exceed 1.3 times the basic exempted band. 
8 In 2016, the VAT rate was increased to 14 per cent in all provinces except those hit by the earthquake in April 
2016. 
9 For more details about the simulation of ICE in ECUAMOD see Jara et al. (2017). 
10 Additionally, the conditionality of the programme extends to prenatal health controls, sexual and reproductive 
health consultations, eradication of child labour and mendacity, maintenance of the dwelling, and an annual update 
of changes in the socio-economic situation of the household. 
11 Our pseudo index might be upward biased with respect to the official index, as the sample used to calculate the 
official index targets, a population in potential need of social protection. 
12 Previous studies based on the National Survey of Employment, Underemployment and Unemployment 
(ENEMDUR) have focused on the percentage of HDT beneficiaries along the income distribution or concentration 
shares, rather than the relative size of the HDT by deciles. Burgos Dávila (2014) shows that around 26 per cent of 
HDT beneficiaries are in the two lowest income quintiles, whereas ECUAMOD finds 36 per cent of beneficiaries in 
the two lowest income quintiles and ENIGHUR 35 per cent. In terms of concentration shares, around 38.7 per cent 
of the total budget allocated to the BDH is concentrated among the two lowest income quintiles according to Ponce 
(2011), whereas results based on ECUAMOD amount to 36.3 per cent and those based on ENIGHUR data directly 
to 35.05 per cent. 
13 The extreme poverty line in Ecuador is defined in terms of the minimum value of a food consumption basket to 
satisfy the nutritional needs for a healthy life. The poverty line is then obtained by using the inverse of the Engel 
coefficient (which measures the relationship between expenditure in food consumption and expenditure in total 
consumption) to scale the extreme poverty line (INEC 2015). 
